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Abstract
Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise
the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice gener-
ated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback
from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in
corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is
unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the
government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some
cases.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31, E62, H2, P16.
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Market economies generate large diﬀerences in income and wealth. The poor are always likely
to demand redistributive policies, but have a much stronger moral justiﬁcation for doing so when
inequality stems from corruption and rent seeking. Yet, often these same measures that are intended
to correct the eﬀect of unfair inequality — such as progressive income taxation, extensive regulation,
and large public projects — create more scope for corruption and rent seeking. Think, for example,
of tax loopholes, corruption in the allocation of public projects, or regulations justiﬁed on the basis
of the greater good but tailored to the interest of particular lobbies. What is more, those who
beneﬁt from corruption may prefer higher taxation and more regulation, not for the sake of the
poor, but because bigger governments increase the rents they can extract. As a result, high levels
of government intervention, corruption, and rent seeking may be self-sustaining.
We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model based on three key ideas. The ﬁrst is
that bigger governments increase the private gains from corruption, lobbying, and other forms of
rent seeking. The second is that the distribution of these gains is uneven in the population. The
third is that societies consider inequality originating in corruption and rent seeking more unfair
than inequality originating from productive eﬀort and market competition.
Our main result is that the combination of the ﬁrst ingredient with either of the other two
ingredients introduces a complementarity between current and past politico-economic outcomes —
there can exist multiple steady states in the level of inequality, redistribution, and corruption.
The ﬁrst building block of our model is that the larger the resources controlled by the govern-
ment, or the more extensive the regulation of the market, the larger the scope for corruption and
rent seeking. While we model corruption strictly as private appropriation of tax revenues outside
the law (i.e. outside of sanctioned redistributive schemes), we intend to capture a broader set of
activities that favor various groups of privileged insiders, these would include industrialists receiv-
ing favorable regulations, public employees receiving high salaries, job security and perks, certain
localities being favored by political entrepreneurs, and so on.1 The second ingredient is also quite
plausible: not all individuals have the same political connections, access to the bureaucracy, or
moral hesitation in becoming corrupt. More novel is the third element, the concern for fairness.
In our model, individual income originates from two sources: a standard productive activity, and
1For a discussion of the use of public employment for patronage and redisitribution, see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(2000) for US cities, and Alesina, Denninger and Rostagno (2001) for Italian regions.
1a non-market, rent-seeking activity. Inequality generated by the productive activity is considered
fair; inequality generated by the rent-seeking activity is unfair. Ceteris paribus, the optimal level
of redistribution increases with the ratio of unfair to fair inequality.2
This concept of fairness, which we introduced in Alesina and Angeletos (2005), is supported by
a variety of experimental and empirical evidence that shows that people are more willing to accept
inequality of outcomes generated by what is perceived as eﬀort or ability than luck or connections.3
Using the World Values Survey, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) and Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) ﬁnd that countries or individuals who believe that wealth and success are mostly the outcome
of “luck and connections” rather than of hard work and eﬀort tend to prefer more leftist policies.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) ﬁnd a similar pattern using the General Social Survey for the United
States.
In the presence of such a fairness concern, a history of big governments and extensive corruption
means that wealth distribution is rather “unfair” in the present, which in turn implies stronger
support for redistribution for any given level of inequality. But even when there is no fairness
concern, if the gains from corruption are unevenly distributed in the population, a history of bigger
governments and higher levels of corruption in the past implies a higher overall level of inequality
in the present, which in turn may raise the support for redistribution. In either case, multiplicity
relies on the endogeneity of corruption: if the size of the government did not aﬀect the scope for
corruption, the steady state would have been unique.
The two steady states can easily be ranked in terms of aggregate income, which is higher in the
low-tax steady state, but cannot be Pareto ranked. First, individuals who have a suﬃciently high
advantage in rent seeking prefer the regime with the bigger government. Second, the poor beneﬁt
from redistribution and may therefore prefer the high-tax steady state even at the cost of more
government resources dissipated by corruption. This eﬀect may underlay the political economy
of various populist regimes in Latin America, which are supported by a prima-facie paradoxical
coalition between the poor, who beneﬁt from redistribution, and rich insiders, who beneﬁtf r o m
corruption.4
These points are consistent with Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), who view the rise of the regulatory
2Along with this altruistic motive for redistribution, there is a standard selﬁsh motive as in Meltzer and Richard
(1981).
3For a review of relevant experimental evidence on fairness, see Fehr and Schmidt (2001); see also Section 2 of
Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
4For a related discussion of populism in Latin America, see Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).
2state in the United States as a response to the “wild capitalism” and the “robber barons” of the
late nineteenth century (Josephson, 1934). For some the American regulatory state had gone too
far, becoming a source of favoritisms and capture (Stigler, 1971). Focusing on developing countries,
Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2003) argue that people who perceive corruption as a major problem
vote for left-wing parties which favor policies that intend to tax the corrupt capitalists. Djankov
et al. (2002) similarly ﬁnd that regulation of entry is more intrusive in countries where corruption
is higher. Finally, using a variety of historical and current examples, Rajan and Zingales (2003)
show how a perception that capitalism is corrupt undermines market reform and supports heavy
interventionism. Our interpretation of these facts is that government intervention is often invoked
in an attempt to ﬁght social injustices, but also that government intervention fosters corruption
and injustice. Welfare programs in developing countries often do not reach the poor and instead
create a vast array of favored groups.
The idea that corruption is a by-product of government activities that are motivated by benev-
olent goals — in our case reducing income inequality — is best formalized in Banerjee (1997), who
explicitly models bureaucracy and corruption. We instead take the usual shortcut of modeling
corruption as a simple rent-seeking activity.5
Multiple equilibria (or steady states) in the level of redistribution appear also in Piketty (1995)
and Benabou and Tirole (2005). The multiplicity there is due to distortions in beliefs about the
sources of inequality, whereas in our model beliefs perfectly reﬂect the truth; moreover, neither of
these papers examines the role of corruption. Andvig and Moene (1991) and Johnson, Kaufman and
Shleifer (1997) obtain multiple equilibria in the level of corruption or tax evasion, but the source of
multiplicity is again very diﬀerent. In Andvig and Moene (1991), the complementarity originates
in the interaction between the proﬁtability of corruption and the number of corrupt oﬃcials; in
Johnson, Kaufman and Shleifer (1997), multiplicity emerges because the larger the unoﬃcial sector,
the smaller the tax base, the lower the amount of public goods provided by the government to the
oﬃcial sector, and hence the lower the incentive of ﬁrms to operate in the oﬃcial sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 examines
the interaction between past and current politico-economic outcomes. Section 4 characterizes the
equilibrium policy for a given history. Section 5 analyzes the steady state(s). Section 6 further
discusses the implications of our results and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
5See, for example, Baumol (1990), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Angeletos and Kollintzas (1999).
32 The Model
We consider a non-overlapping-generations model. Each generation consists of a large number of
agents (a measure-one mass, indexed by i and distributed uniformly over [0,1]). Agents live only for
one period and are connected to past and future generations via intergenerational wealth transfers
and parental investment (bequests, education, status, etc.). During their lives, agents engage in
two types of economic activity: a productive activity (work, invest, etc.) and a rent-seeking one
(corruption, lobbying etc.). Preferences for redistribution originate from two sources: a selﬁsh
motive and an altruistic demand for fairness.
Production and corruption. Wealth net of taxes, transfers, and rent seeking is the product
of innate ability, eﬀort, and parental investment. For agent i in generation t, this is given by
wit = Aiteit + kit−1, (1)
where Ait denotes the agent’s innate ability, eit denotes his eﬀort, and kit−1 the his parents’ invest-
ment or bequest.
We let redistribution be the only reason for the existence of a government. Following Romer
(1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), we assume that the government imposes a ﬂat tax on
individual wealth in order to ﬁnance a lump-sum transfer across all agents (or some sort of redis-
tributive public good). Unlike earlier work, however, we introduce corruption by letting a fraction
of government resources be up for grabs.
In particular, denoting with Gt t h es i z eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n ti np e r i o dt, Rt the resources that are
up for grabs, and Tt the resources that remain for lump-sum redistribution, we let
Tt =( 1− φ)Gt and Rt = φGt, (2)
where φ ∈ [0,1] parametrizes the extent of corruption.6 Rt in turn is split among the agents on the
basis of their rent-seeking activity: agent i receives a portion zit/Zt of the total pie,
rit =
zit
Zt
Rt, (3)
6Olken (2003) collected data on a redistributive program for rice in Indonesian villages and found that between 20
and 40 per cent of the rice collected for redistribution disappeared in the process, obviously stolen by various village
administrators and their friends.
4where Zt is the aggregate, and zit is his own, level of rent seeking. The latter is given by zit = Bitxit,
where xit is the eﬀort agent i allocates to rent seeking and Bit is his eﬃciency in corruption (the
extent of his political connections, his negotiation power vis-à-vis bureaucrats, or his indiﬀerence
towards the ethics of his business life). Note that rent seeking is a zero-sum game: it aﬀects only
the distribution of the pie that is up for grabs, not its size.
Disposable wealth is then given by the sum of after-tax wealth, lump-sum transfers from the
government, and proceeds from rent seeking:
yit =( 1− τt)wit + Tt + rit. (4)
This is spent on private consumption, which we denote with cit, and parental investment, kit.T h e
agent’s budget is thus:
cit + kit = yit. (5)
The government budget, on the other hand, is given by
Gt = λτtWt +( 1− λ)τt−1Wt−1, (6)
where Wt is aggregate wealth in period t, τt is the tax rate in that period, and λ ∈ [0,1]. We
allow λ<1 for various reasons. First, this captures the idea that the size of the government
and the pie that is up for grabs in one period is not a function of contemporaneous tax revenues
alone.7 Second, we could interpret λ<1 as a time-to-build assumption: welfare programs and
other redistributive schemes set in place by one generation partly extend to future generations.
Finally, and most importantly, λ parametrizes the extent to which generation t internalizes the
eﬀect that bigger governments lead to more corruption: the higher λ, the higher the same-period
increase in corruption that results from a given increase in tax revenues.
Individual preferences. Agents’ preferences are given by
Uit = uit − γitΩt, (7)
where uit measures the private utility from own consumption, bequests, and eﬀort choices, and Ωt
7Note that, as long as we focus on steady states, (6) is equivalent to the more general speciﬁcation Gt = P∞
j=0 λjτt+jWt+j, with λ0 = λ and
P∞
j=1 λj =1− λ.
5represents a common disutility generated by unfair social outcomes (to be deﬁned below). The
parameter γit measures the strength of the demand for fairness and is allowed to diﬀer across
individuals.8
For tractability, we assume quadratic eﬀort costs and a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over consump-
tion and bequests:
uit = u(cit,k it,e it,x it)= 1
(1−δ)1−δδδ (cit)
1−δ (kit)δ − 1
2
£
(eit)2 +( xit)2¤
, (8)
where δ ∈ (0,1). The ﬁrst term represents the utility from own consumption and bequests, the
second the disutility of eﬀort. The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation implies that optimal consumption
and parental investment satisfy
cit =( 1− δ)yit and kit = δyit, (9)
so that δ represents the fraction of wealth allocated to parental investment (equivalently, the
strength of intergenerational linkages).
Fairness. The concept of fairness we adopt is based upon the distinction between two types
of inequality: “justiﬁable” inequality induced by variation in talent and eﬀort, and “unjustiﬁable”
inequality induced by variation in corruption and rent seeking.
Since wealth is transmitted from one generation to another through parental investment, we
need to keep track of this distinction along each agent’s entire family tree. We assume that parental
investment is considered fair only to the extent that it reﬂects income from eﬀort and talent — not
income from corruption and rent seeking. We thus deﬁne the fair levels of consumption, bequests,
a n dw e a l t ha s
ˆ cit =( 1− δ)ˆ yit, ˆ kit = δˆ yit, and ˆ yit =ˆ wit = Aiteit + ˆ kit−1. (10)
(Throughout, fair levels are indicated by a hat.) Our measure of social injustice is then the average
8An interesting possibility is that γit is inversely related to Bit, in which case individuals who are most proﬁcient
at being corrupt are also those least oﬀended by it.
6distance between actual and fair utilities:
Ωt =
R
i
(uit − ˆ uit)2, (11)
where uit = u(cit,k it,e i,x i) and ˆ uit = u(ˆ cit,ˆ kit,e i,x i).9
By conditions (8) and (9), utility is quasi-linear in disposable wealth, implying that uit − ˆ uit =
yit − ˆ yit for all i and therefore Ωt =
R
i(yit − ˆ yit)2. As we will see later in more detail, ˆ yit reﬂects
the cumulative contribution of talent and eﬀort throughout the individual’s family history, while
yit also includes the cumulative contribution of corruption and rent-seeking. Ωt thus takes into
account the intergenerational propagation of unjustiﬁable income.
The political process. We assume an unstructured model of political choice which is repre-
sented by the maximization of the following social welfare function:
Ut =
R
Uitdπi. (12)
π :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is a probability measure capturing the distribution of political power. When πi
assigns measure one to the median of the population, this speciﬁcation essentially nests the median-
voter paradigm. When instead πi is the identity function, the policy maximizes utility behind the
veil of ignorance. Alternatively, πi may assign more weight to the rich or the agents with political
connections (i.e., agents with relatively high Bit).
Equilibrium. Let αit ≡ A2
it and βit ≡ B2
it. To simplify, we assume that (αit,βit) are in-
dependent of each other and that (αit,βit,γit) are i.i.d. across agents but fully persistent over
time. A “dynasty” is thus identiﬁed with a particular draw (αi,βi,γi). Finally, for any parameter
θ ∈ {α,β,γ}, we let ¯ θ =
R
θidi and ˜ θ =
R
θidπi denote the simple and politically-weighted popu-
lation averages, ∆θ = θ − ˜ θ the distance between the two, and σ2
θ = Va r(θi) the variance in the
cross-section of the population. We will see that a suﬃcient statistic for the characteristics of the
economy turns out to be the parameter vector
E =( φ,˜ γ,∆α,∆β,σα,σβ;¯ α, ¯ β,˜ α, ˜ β,δ).
∆α and ∆β play a role similar to the gap between the median and the mean of the wealth distribution
9An alternative deﬁnition of fair utility that gives similar results is ˆ uit = u(ˆ cit,ˆ kit,e i,0).
7in Meltzer and Richard (1981). σα and σβ, on the other hand, parametrize the exogenous variation
in the fair and unfair sources of wealth, respectively, and aﬀect outcomes only when there is a
demand for fairness (˜ γ>0). We ﬁnally deﬁne
Deﬁnition An equilibrium for economy E is a sequence of policies {τt,G t}∞
t=0 and allocations
{(eit,x it,c it,k it)i∈[0,1]}∞
t=0 such that:
(i) Given policy (τt,G t) and endowment kit−1, the bundle (eit,x it,c it,k it,y it) maximizes Uit
subject to (1) and (4)-(5), for all i and t.
(ii) Given history of policies and allocations {τs,G s,(eis,x is,c is,k is)i∈[0,1]}t−1
s=0, the policy (τt,G t)
in period t maximizes (12), for all t.
3 The interaction of corruption, inequality, and fairness
We start by analyzing how inequality, fairness and corruption aﬀect optimal policy choices and how
policies in turn aﬀect the equilibrium levels of inequality, fairness and corruption.
Using equations (4) and (10), the gap between actual and fair income can be decomposed into
four terms:
yit − ˆ yit =( 1− τt)(wit − ˆ wit) − τt ˆ wit + Gt +( rit − Rt). (13)
The ﬁrst term implies that a higher tax rate corrects more for the unfairness generated by unjus-
tiﬁable inherited wealth, whereas the second term implies that a higher tax rate also deprives the
individual of some of her fair wealth. Therefore, to the extent that wit−1 6=ˆ wit−1 for a positive
measure of agents, society faces a trade oﬀ in choosing the size of the government that is optimal
from a fairness perspective. The last term, on the other hand, captures the net gain or loss of the
agent from his participation in the zero-sum game of corruption, which also depends on the size of
the government.
The trade-oﬀ introduced by fairness becomes clear once we use (13) to express Ωt as a weighted
average of the variance decomposition of wealth inequality:
Ωt = τ2
tVa r(ˆ wit)+( 1− τt)2Va r(wit − ˆ wit)+Va r(rit)+covst, (14)
where Va r(.) denotes variance in the cross-section of agents and covst includes constants and
covariance terms (see Appendix for the derivation and the exact formula). When (τt,G t)=0 , the
8above reduces to Ωt = Va r(wit − ˆ wit), thus measuring how unfair the wealth distribution would be
in the absence of government intervention; when instead (τt,G t) > 0, the above incorporates the
eﬀect of redistribution and corruption.
To gain further intuition, ignore for a moment the covariance terms in equation (14) and suppose
that minimizing Ωt is the only policy goal, taxation is not distortionary, and the wealth distribution
is exogenous. The optimal tax rate is then given by
1 − τ
τ
=
Va r(ˆ wit)
Va r(wit − ˆ wit)
. (15)
T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d er e p r e s e n t st h esignal-to-noise ratio in the wealth distribution: the signal is the
fair component of wealth, the cumulative eﬀect of talent and eﬀort; the noise is the unfair compo-
nent, the cumulative eﬀect of corruption and rent seeking. The optimal tax rate is decreasing in
this signal-to-noise ratio, reﬂecting the desire to correct for the inequality generated by corruption.
The wealth distribution, however, is endogenous in equilibrium; as we show next, the signal-to-
noise ratio itself depends on current and past tax policies.
Consider the equilibrium allocations for a given policy. Household i in generation t is born with
ag i v e nkit−1 and chooses (ci
t,ki
t,e i
t,x i
t) so as to maximize his utility subject to his budget constraint,
taking (τt,G t) and Ωt as given. The optimal levels of consumption and parental investment are
given by condition (9). Utility then reduces to uit = yit − e2
it/2 − x2
it/2, implying that the optimal
levels of eﬀort devoted to production and rent seeking are, respectively,
eit =( 1− τt)Ait and xit = BitφGt/Zt. (16)
The equilibrium level of corruption is thus increasing in the fraction of government resources up
for grabs:
Zt =
q
¯ βφGt. (17)
Combining (16) and (17), we infer that
Aiteit =( 1− τt)αit and rit =( βit/¯ β)φGt. (18)
To simplify the notation, we henceforth normalize ¯ β =1 .
9Let ¯ τt
s ≡ 1 −
Qt
j=s (1 − τj) denote the cumulative rate of taxation between periods s and t,
with the convention ¯ τt
s =0when s>t .As we show in the Appendix, iterating on (1), (4) and (9)
implies that, in equilibrium, actual wealth is wit = Aiteit + kit−1, with
kit−1 =
P
s≤t−1
δt−s ¡
1 − ¯ τt−1
s+1
¢
[(1 − τs)Aiseis + Gs +( ris − Rs)]. (19)
In contrast, fair wealth is ˆ wit = Aiteit + ˆ kit−1, with
ˆ kit−1 =
P
s≤t−1
δt−sAiteit. (20)
Combining the above with (18), we infer that heterogeneity in Ait generates variation in the fair level
of wealth (the signal ˆ wit), whereas heterogeneity in Bit generates variation in the unfair component
of wealth (the noise wit − ˆ wit).
The relative contribution of the two types of inequality depends on past policies: the period-t
equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio reduces to
Va r(ˆ wit)
Va r(wit − ˆ wit)
=
[
P
s≤t
δt−s (1 − τs)]
2σ2
α
[
P
s≤t−1
δt−s¯ τt−1
s (1 − τs)]
2σ2
α +[
P
s≤t−1
δt−s ¡
1 − ¯ τt−1
s+1
¢
(φGs)]
2σ2
β
, (21)
where σ2
α = Va r(αi),σ 2
β = Va r(βi), and (αi,βi) ≡
¡
A2
i,B2
i
¢
. This ratio tends to decrease with
Gs for every s ≤ t − 1, because a history of big governments means that corruption has played a
major role in shaping the wealth distribution. The impact of τs, on the other hand, is generally
non-monotonic. When there has been no corruption in the past, a higher tax in the past means
a less fair wealth distribution today; but when there has been corruption in the distant past, a
higher tax in the more recent past may have already corrected for the unfairness of the earlier
corruption. Notwithstanding the latter eﬀect, a society that has a history of high tax distortions,
big governments, and pervasive corruption will tend to inherit an unfair wealth distribution, which
in turn may raise the “altruistic” demand for redistribution in the present.
Moreover, if the variation in rent-seeking abilities across the population (σβ) is high, an economy
with a history of high taxation and high corruption may also inherit a high overall level of inequality.
This may raise the “selﬁsh” demand for redistribution.
We conclude that the interaction of corruption with either the fairness concern or the selﬁsh
10motive introduces a complementarity between past and current political choices: the equilibrium
tax today may be an increasing function of the tax yesterday.
4 Equilibrium policy
In this section we characterize the equilibrium policy τt for a given history {τs}s≤t−1 . We focus
on stationary histories and begin by examining how a particular individual ranks diﬀerent policy
alternatives in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Suppose τs = τ ∈ [0,1] for all s<t .The utility of agent i in period t is
Uit = V (τt,τ;αi,βi) − γiΩ(τt,τ) (22)
where
V (τt,τ;α,β) ≡− [1
2ατ2
t + 1
2βφGt(τt,τ)+1−λ
λ G(τt,τ)] (23)
+τt(1 − τt)(¯ α − α)
+τt
δ
1−δ(1−τ)[(1 − τ)
2 (¯ α − α)+φG(τ,τ)(1− β)]
+φG(τt,τ)(βi − 1)
Ω(τt,τ) ≡ [−τt (1 − τt)+( 1− τt)
δ(1−τ)2
1−δ(1−τ) −
δ(1−τ)
1−δ ]2σ2
α (24)
+[G(τt,τ)+( 1− τt) δ
1−δ(1−τ)G(τ,τ)]2φ2σ2
β
+[ 1−λ
(1−δ)λ (G(τt,τ) − G(τ,τ))]2
G(τt,τ) ≡ 1
1−δ[λτt (1 − (1 − δ)τt − δτ)+( 1− λ)τ (1 − τ)]¯ α (25)
This deﬁnes i’s preferences over τt; the expressions in equations (25)-(22) are complicated, but
their interpretation is simple.
Condition (24) gives the equilibrium level of social injustice. The ﬁrst term represents the
injustice generated when a positive tax reallocates income from more worthy (i.e., more talented,
hard-working) to less worthy agents. This term is positive only if σα > 0, that is, only if there
is justiﬁable inequality. The second term represents the injustice generated by corruption and
rent seeking. This term is positive only if φ>0 and σβ > 0, that is, only if there is corruption
and unjustiﬁable inequality. Moreover, this term is non-monotonic in τt : a bigger government
11corrects more for the corruption in the past but also opens the door to more corruption today.
Both terms depend on the past level of τ,as the size of the government in the past has determined
the distribution of kit−1 inherited today.10
Condition (23), on the other hand, gives the private utility an agent enjoys from his eﬀort
choices and wealth. The ﬁrst term represents the distortionary costs of taxation and corruption;
the second and third terms capture the redistribution of contemporaneous income and inherited
bequests; the last term is the net transfer enjoyed from rent seeking activity.
Finally, condition (25) gives the equilibrium size of the government. When δ =0and λ =1 , in
which case the model reduces to a static economy, (25) reduces to Gt = τt(1−τt). More generally,
(25) exhibits the usual Laﬀer-curve eﬀect: at very high levels of taxation, a further increase in τt
distorts incentives and reduces income so much that tax revenues fall. At the same time, Gt is a
decreasing function of τ, for higher tax distortions in the past imply less aggregate income in the
past and therefore a lower tax base in the present.
Consider now how τt is chosen in equilibrium. By (22), individual utilities are linear in individual
characteristics (αi,βi,γi). The policy objective thus reduces to
Ut =
R
uidπi = V (τt,τ;˜ α, ˜ β) − ˜ γΩ(τt,τ);
and since τt maximizes Ut, we have the following result.11
Proposition 2 Suppose τs = τ for all s<t .The equilibrium policy in period t is τt = F(τ;E),
where
F(τ;E) ≡ arg max
τ0∈[0,1]
{V (τ0,τ;˜ α, ˜ β) − ˜ γΩ(τ0,τ)}. (26)
5 Multiple steady states
The mapping F in (26) represents the best response of generation t to a stationary history. A
steady state is any ﬁxed point of this mapping, that is, any τ∗ such that τ∗ = F(τ∗;E).
In order to gain intuition into the steady-state properties of the model, consider ﬁrst φ =˜ γ =0 ,
that is, disregard both corruption and fairness. To simplify, let also λ =1 . The mapping F then
10The last term in equation (24) measures Y − ˆ Y (see the Appendix).
11Note that policy preferences in any given period depend only on realized past policies, not expectations about
future policies. This is due to the warm-glow speciﬁcation of intergenerational altruism and rules out any form of
strategic interaction across generations.
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Figure 1: The standard Meltzer-Richard eﬀect — unique steady state in the absence of corruption.
reduces to
τt = F(τ)=
∆α +
δ(1−τ)2
1−δ(1−τ)∆α
¯ α + ∆α
, (27)
where, recall, ∆α ≡ ¯ α − ˜ α.W h e n δ =0 , meaning that there are no intergenerational links, the
above gives τt = ∆α/(¯ α + ∆α). This result is identical to that in Meltzer and Richard (1981): the
optimal tax rate is increasing in ∆α, which can be interpreted as the distance between the mean
and the median of the population. When δ>0, the additional term
£
δ(1 − τ)2/1 − δ(1 − τ)
¤
∆α
reﬂects the gain from redistributing inheritances: the higher the distance between the mean and
the median inheritance, the higher the gain from redistribution for the median agent.
In the absence of corruption, a higher level of redistribution in the past implies less inequality in
inheritances and therefore a lower gain from redistribution today. The optimal τt in (27) decreases
with τ and F intersects the 45-degree line only once, as illustrated by the solid line in Figure 1.12
This ensures that the steady state is unique.
If we allow for a fairness concern (˜ γ>0) but continue to assume no corruption (φ =0 ) ,
the optimal level of redistribution is zero from a fairness perspective. The Meltzer-Richard eﬀect,
however, kicks in as long as ∆α > 0. All that fairness then does is to increase the cost of taxation, as
a higher tax increases the gap between fair and actual outcomes. The F c u r v et h u ss h i f t sd o w n ,a n d
the optimal tax is lower than when ˜ γ =0 , as illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 1. Nevertheless,
the steady state remains unique.
12All numerical examples are only illustrative.
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Figure 2: Self-sustained corruption — multiple steady states in the absence of both the standard
Meltzer-Richard eﬀect and the concern for fairness.
Consider next the impact of corruption (φ>0) in the absence of a fairness concern (˜ γ =0 ) .A l s o
let ∆α =0and ∆β > 0, that is, disregard the usual Meltzer-Richard eﬀect but allow for “skewness”
in the distribution of rent-seeking abilities. This introduces a novel motive for redistribution. If the
size of the government in the past is large, then the income from corruption and rent seeking in the
past is also high. With ∆β > 0=∆α, this implies that the “median” of the income distribution in
the present is poorer than the mean, not because his parents have been less productive, but because
his parents have been less eﬀective in rent seeking. Hence, inequality originating in corruption in
the past creates support for redistribution in the present. But as the optimal size of the government
today is positive, the level of corruption today is also positive, which tends to make high levels of
government and corruption self-sustaining.
On the other hand, if a society starts with a history of no (or small) government and no (low)
corruption, there is no corruption-born inequality in the present, which together with the fact that
there is no (low) standard Meltzer-Richard eﬀect implies that the optimal size of government in the
present is zero (small). We conclude that multiple levels of corruption and redistribution can be
self-sustained even in the absence of any concern for fairness. Such a situation is illustrated by the
solid line in Figure 2: there are two stable steady states, one with τ =0and another with τ>0,
as well as an intermediate unstable one, which we disregard.
The coeﬃcient λ now plays an important role. The dotted line in Figure 2 illustrates the impact
of an increase in λ : once λ is suﬃciently high, the multiplicity of steady states may disappear. This
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Figure 3: The eﬀect of fairness — multiple steady states in the absence of any self-motivated
redistribution.
is because the attempt to redistribute from the high-β individuals to the low-β ones becomes self-
defeating when λ is very high, as then a large fraction of the tax revenue is up for grabs by the very
same high-β individuals whom taxation is supposed to target. In other words, the higher λ is, the
more the current generation internalizes the eﬀect that an increase in taxation and redistribution
leads to an increase in corruption.
Finally, consider the interaction of corruption and fairness (φ>0and ˜ γ>0). To make the
argument sharper, let ∆α = ∆β =0 .I f ˜ γ were zero, taxation would have only costs and no
beneﬁts, so that τt =0would be both the unique equilibrium and the unique steady state. When
˜ γ>0,F(0) = 0 and τ =0remains a steady state: a history of no taxation and no government
means also a history of no corruption, so that the wealth distribution is fair and there is no need
to redistribute for fairness reasons.
If, however, the economy inherits a history of high taxes and big governments, this means also
a history in which corruption has played some role in determining the wealth distribution, in which
case there is necessarily a desire to redistribute. It is then possible that, together with τ =0 , there
also exists a steady state in which τ>0. Such a possibility is illustrated by the solid line in Figure
3. The two extreme intersection points of F with the 45-degree line identify the two locally stable
steady states. The lower one corresponds to τ =0 ,Z=0 , and Ω =0(low taxation, low corruption,
and fair outcomes), the higher one to τ>0,Z>0, and Ω > 0 (high taxation, high corruption,
and unfair outcomes).
150.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
historical tax τ
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
t
n
e
r
r
u
c
x
a
t
τ
t
=
F
H
τ
L
Figure 4: The eﬀect of fairness combined with the Meltzer-Richard eﬀect — multiple steady states.
The impact of λ is similar as in the earlier case of self-sustained corruption. As illustrated
b yt h ed o t t e dl i n ei nF i g u r e3 ,a ni n c r e a s ei nλ reduces the incentive to redistribute and limits
the possibility of multiple steady states. The only diﬀerence is that taxation now becomes self-
defeating, not because it increases the resources that are up for grabs by high-β individuals, but
rather because it increases the inequality induced by corruption.
In the examples depicted in Figures 2 and 3, the lower steady state has a zero tax rate: if there
has been no taxation and no corruption in the past, no taxation is optimal today. This is an artefact,
however, of the absence of any other motive for taxation. If instead there were some exogenous
amount of government spending to be ﬁnanced, the lower steady state could have a positive tax
rate. The same is true if the concern for fairness interacts with self-motivated redistribution (that
i s ,i fw ec o m b i n e˜ γ,σα,σβ > 0 with ∆α > 0). This case is illustrated by Figure 4.
Summarizing the above analysis, we have the main result of the paper.
Proposition 3 A steady state for economy E is any ﬁxed point τ∗ = F(τ∗,E).
If there is no room for corruption (φ =0 ) , there exists a unique steady state.
If instead there is room for corruption (φ>0) coupled with either skewness in rent-seeking
abilities (∆β > 0) or a demand for fairness (˜ γ>0), there robustly exist multiple steady states.
166 Discussion
i. When there is no corruption, the steady state is unique, as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). In
this case, a demand for fairness aﬀects the level but not the determinacy of the steady state — it
merely introduces a trade-oﬀ between the private good of redistribution from the rich to the poor
and the public good of fairness.
ii. When there is corruption, we may have a complementarity between past and current policies
for two reasons: either because more corruption in the past means more inequality in the present,
or because more corruption in the past means more unfairness in the present. Either one may lead
to multiple steady states — or, more generally, to persistence in politico-economic outcomes.
iii. We could easily recast our main result in a static (one-generation) economy as multiple
self-fulﬁlling equilibria. We chose to focus on the dynamic version merely to emphasize the role of
history. Diﬀerent regimes are explained by diﬀerent historical experiences, not diﬀerent self-fulﬁlling
expectations.
iv. A theoretical prediction shared by many models of redistribution is that more inequality
leads to more redistribution. There is plenty of evidence, however, that this prediction is rejected
by the data.13 Our model may help explain this puzzle in two ways. First, an economy with less
inequality may have more redistribution because more of that inequality is due to corruption and is
thus considered unfair, or because there is a stronger demand for fairness; in this case, the missing
variable is the level of corruption or the strength of concerns for fairness. Second, an economy with
less inequality may have more redistribution because it rests in a “higher” steady state; in this
case, the missing variable is history.
v. A strong correlation displayed by the data is that corruption decreases with income per
capita (e.g., Mauro, 1995, Knack and Keefer, 1995). One could interpret these data in the context
of our model as suggesting that φ is higher in poorer countries. An alternative interpretation is
that poverty and corruption are both endogenous. In this case, certain countries may be stuck in
a corruption-induced poverty trap. Note that poorer countries tend to have smaller governments
as measured by the ratio of government spending over GDP; yet, government intrusiveness in the
economy rely also on regulations and other various sources of intervention that go beyond the share
13See for example Perotti (1996). Alesina and Glaeser (2004) document in detail that there is both more pre-tax
inequality and less redistribution in the United States than in continental Europe. Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2003)
similarly ﬁnd that more inequality often leads to the election of right-wing governments.
17of spending over GDP and that tend to be higher in poorer economies.14
vi. When there are multiple steady states, the one with bigger government (higher τ) is inferior
in the sense that fewer resources are devoted to productive activities, while more resources are
wasted in the zero-sum game of rent seeking. However, in general the two equilibria cannot be
Pareto ranked for two reasons. First, those who are especially productive in rent seeking may prefer
the high corruption equilibrium. Second, the poor may prefer a high level of redistribution even at
the cost of high corruption. An interesting possibility is then that a large corrupt government may
draw support from an unlikely coalition of the very poor and the rich insiders. This is a coalition
of those who beneﬁt from high redistribution per se and those who are hurt by taxation per se
but are close to the levers of power. This seems a pretty accurate description of several populist
governments in Latin America, as emphasized for instance by Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).
vii. Fairness can be lower in the steady state with bigger government, for a larger proportion
on wealth can then be due to corruption. So, paradoxically, the attempt to correct the impact of
corruption and increase fairness may sustain a steady state which is less fair. This is the sort of
paradox emphasized by Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2003) when they ask, “why doesn’t capitalism ﬂow
to poor countries?” The answer that our paper proposes is that the perception that capitalism is
corrupt and that government intervention is necessary can be self-sustaining; quite unfortunately,
attempts to reduce unfairness often result, not only in higher eﬃciency losses, but also in more
corruption and less fair outcomes.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The main message of our analysis is that redistributive and regulatory policies intended to reduce
inequality or improve the fairness of economic outcomes may bring about even more opportunities
for corruption. This creates a policy dilemma: a small government does not correct enough for
market inequalities and injustices; a large government increases corruption and rent-seeking.
Many policy-makers and observers appear to be aware of this trade oﬀ. Especially in developing
countries, public spending toward the poor is often mis-targeted and creates pockets of corruption
and favoritism; and often certain lobbies come out as big winners at the expense of the truly needy.
14Needless to say, there are many reasons — unrelated to the story highlighted in this paper — that explain the
growth of government as a function of per capita income. For a survey of the literature of the size of the government,
see Mueller (2003).
18Nevertheless, even well-intended policy-makers would resist calls for cutting these programs because
they perceive the cost of corruption as worth paying — this is often the only way to at least partially
improve the condition of the poor.
What is perhaps less understood is that the willingness to accommodate some corruption in the
present may lead to a vicious cycle where high levels of government intervention, market ineﬃciency,
and corruption are self-sustained in perpetuity. The failure to internalize this intergenerational
externality can jeopardize the long-run eﬀectiveness of well-intended policies.
Appendix
P r o o fo fC o n d i t i o n( 1 4 ) . From the familiar result that E
¡
X2¢
=( E X)
2 + Va r(X), we have
Ωt =
R
i (yit − ˆ yit)
2 =( Y − ˆ Y )2 + Va r(yit − ˆ yit), where Y − ˆ Y =
R
i(yit − ˆ yit). By the assumption
that αit and βit are independent, Cov(ˆ wit,r it)=0 . (13) thus implies
Va r(yit − ˆ yit)=( 1− τt)2Va r(wit − ˆ wit)+τ2
tVa r(ˆ wit)+Va r(rit)+
+2 ( 1− τt)τtCov(ˆ wit,w it − ˆ wit)+2( 1− τt)Cov(rit,w it − ˆ wit)
Combining the above and letting
covst =( Y − ˆ Y )2 +2 ( 1− τt)τtCov(ˆ wit,w it − ˆ wit)+2( 1− τt)Cov(rit,w it − ˆ wit)
proves (14). QED
Proof of Conditions (19), (18), and (21). To simplify notation, let qt ≡ δ (1 − τt),Q t
t =
1,Q t
s ≡
Qt
j=s+1 qj for s ≤ t−1,π t ≡ δ [(1 − τt)Atet + Tt + rt], and drop the index i. Note that qt ∈
(0,1) and therefore Qt
s ∈ (0,1) as well. We can then write kt = δyt = qtkt−1+πt and therefore kt =
P
s≤t Qt
sπs. Combining the latter with Qt
s = δt−s ¡
1 − ¯ τt
s+1
¢
and πs = δ [(1 − τs)Ases + Ts + rs],
using Ts = Gs − Rt, and expressing the result for t − 1 instead of t, gives (19).
Next, by (16), zit = Bitxit =
¡
B2
it/Zt
¢
Rt =
¡
B2
it/Zt
¢
φGt. By implication, the equilibrium
l e v e lo fc o r r u p t i o ns a t i s ﬁes Zt =
R
i zit =
R
i Bitxit =
R
i B2
itφGt/Zt. Solving for Zt gives (17) and
19combining this with (16) gives the second part of (18). Finally, from (19), (20), and (18), the
assumption that αit = αi and βit = βi for all t, and the normalization ¯ β =1 , we have:
wit − ˆ wit =
P
s≤t−1
δt−s{−¯ τt−1
s (1 − τs)αi +( 1− ¯ τt−1
s+1)(Gs +( βi − 1)φGs)},
ˆ wit =
P
s≤t
δt−s(1 − τs)αi.
Calculating the variances gives (21). QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Consider a stationary history, τs = τ for all s ≤ t − 1, in which case
we also have ¯ τt
s =1− (1 − τ)
t−s+1 and Gs = G, Ws = W, Ys = Y, Ks = K, for all s ≤ t − 1. To
compute the stationary levels G, W, Y, and K, note that Y =
R
i yi =( 1− τ)W +G, which together
with G = λτW +(1− λ)τW = τW gives Y = W, and therefore K =
R
ki = δY = δW. Combining
this with W =
R
i (Aiseis + kis−1)=( 1− τ)¯ α + K gives W = 1
1−δ (1 − τ)¯ α, and therefore G =
1
1−δτ (1 − τ)¯ α and K = σ
1−δ (1 − τ)¯ α.
Now consider equilibrium outcomes in period t. Using Kt−1 = K, we now have
Wt =( 1− τt)¯ α + Kt−1 = 1
1−δ (1 − (1 − δ)τt − δτ)¯ α (28)
which together with Gt = λτtWt +( 1− λ)τW gives (25).
When τs = τ for all s ≤ t − 1,
P
s≤t−1 δt−s ¡
1 − ¯ τt−1
s+1
¢
= δ
1−δ(1−τ) and therefore
wit =( 1− τt)αi + δ
1−δ(1−τ){(1 − τ)
2 αi +( G +( βi − 1)φG)}, (29)
whereas ˆ wit =( 1− τt)αi + δ
1−δ(1 − τ)αi. It follows that
yit − ˆ yit =( 1 − τt)wit + Gt +( rit − Rt) − ˆ wit
= { − τt (1 − τt)+ δ
1−δ(1−τ) (1 − τt)(1− τ)
2 − δ
1−δ (1 − τ)}αi
+{Gt +( 1− τt) δ
1−δ(1−τ)G}(1 + φ(βi − 1))
Next, using (13) and wit− ˆ wit = kit−1−ˆ kit−1,w eg e tY − ˆ Y =( Kt−1− ˆ Kt−1)+(Gt − τtWt). By the
expressions for Gt and G, Gt − τtWt = −(1−λ
λ )(Gt − G), while K − ˆ K = δ(W − ˆ W)=δ(Y − ˆ Y ).
20It follows that Y − ˆ Y = 1−λ
(1−δ)λ (Gt − G) and therefore
Ωt = Va r(yit − ˆ yit)+( Y − ˆ Y )2 =
= { − τt (1 − τt)+ δ
1−δ(1−τ) (1 − τt)(1− τ)
2 − δ
1−δ (1 − τ)}
2σ2
α +
+{Gt + δ
1−δ(1−τ) (1 − τt)G}
2φ2σ2
β + { 1−λ
(1−δ)λ (Gt − G)}
2.
Substituting G = G(τ,τ) and Gt = G(τt,τ) and rearranging gives (24).
Finally, consider the private utility of agent i in period t. Since the history is stationary and
individual characteristics are fully persistent, we have that kis = ki (and similarly yis = yi,r is = wi,
ris = wi) for all s ≤ t − 1. From (8) and (16),
uit = 1
2(1 − τt)2αi +( 1− τt)ki + Gt +(1
2βi − 1)φGt. (30)
Using the fact that Gt − τtWt = −1−λ
λ (Gt − G) and τtWt = τt ((1 − τt)¯ α + K), and rearranging,
we get
uit = {1
2αi + ki + 1−λ
λ G} − {1
2αiτ2
t + 1
2βiφGt + 1−λ
λ Gt} + (31)
+τt (1 − τt)(¯ α − αi)+τt (K − ki)+( βi − 1)φGt,
Next, as in (29), ki = δ
1−δ(1−τ)
h
(1 − τ)
2 αi + G +( βi − 1)φG
i
, and therefore
K − ki = δ
1−δ(1−τ)
h
(1 − τ)
2 (¯ α − αi)+( 1− βi)φG
i
. (32)
That is, agent i has inherited more wealth than the mean if his αi and/or βi is suﬃciently high.
Combining the above with (31), and ignoring the term 1
2αi +ki + 1−λ
λ G which does not depend on
τt, we get
uit = −{1
2αiτ2
t + 1
2βiφGt + 1−λ
λ Gt} + τt (1 − τt)(¯ α − αi)+
+τt
δ
1−δ(1−τ){(1 − τ)
2 (¯ α − αi)+( 1− βi)φG} +( βi − 1)φGt.
Using G = G(τ,τ) and Gt = G(τt,τ) into the above gives (23) and concludes the proof. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s2a n d3 .It follows from the analysis in the main text. QED
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